"Illegal Promotion of Neurontin"
Neurontin
Update on the Illegal Promotion of Gabapentin (NEURONTIN)
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In the May 2002 issue of Worst Pills, Best Pills News, we wrote about
Neurontin, a drug approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for
treating seizures, a somewhat limited potential market, that was illegally
transformed into a “blockbuster” drug with sales approaching $1.5 billion in
2001. The metamorphosis was accomplished by fabricating a number of uses for the
drug that are not FDA approved. These included bipolar disorder, attention
deficient disorder, and migraine. The use of a drug that is not approved by the
FDA is referred to as an “off-label” use.
The May article was based on New York Times reporting and documents from
the U. S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. This court recently
released new documents that for the first time gave the public an inside picture
of the lengths to which a pharmaceutical company will go to sell a drug even
when there is no evidence that it is safe or effective for the uses being
promoted.
This article is based on allegations made in recently released court
documents.
Neurontin was originally produced by Parke-Davis, which was acquired by
Pfizer, Inc, of New York in 2000. The only FDA approved use for Neurontin at
that time was as an add-on treatment for epilepsy. This is a very limited market
with little upward potential for sales. The new court documents allege that
Parke-Davis knew that pain management, psychiatric disorders, anxiety and
depression were immense markets which, if tapped, could yield enormous profits
from sales of Neurontin
The Decision to Promote Gabapentin for Unapproved Uses
Documents revealed that after an extensive economic analysis, senior
officials at Parke-Davis determined that it was not sufficiently profitable for
Parke-Davis to obtain FDA approval for Neurontin's alternative uses mentioned
above by doing the types of studies necessary for approval. Instead, company
officials developed a strategy that would allow Parke-Davis to avoid the costs
of proving Neurontin’s safety and effectiveness for these other uses, while
allowing the company to enter the lucrative off-label markets.
Taking advantage of a loophole in the FDA’s off-label marketing rules,
Parke-Davis decided to employ a “publication strategy” that would allow it to
promote Neurontin by the massive distribution of publications supposedly written
by independent researchers who purportedly described the scientific evaluation
of Neurontin. Another advantage of this strategy, from the company’s
perspective, was that it could be done immediately. There was no need to wait
for the results of scientifically conducted clinical trials to determine if
Neurontin was actually effective in the treatment of these conditions and submit
them to the FDA for approval.
Payment to Doctors to Increase Gabapentin Prescriptions
The company’s “publication strategy” required doctors to perform the work
normally performed by the company’s sales force in order to promote Neurontin.
This necessitated that Parke-Davis make tens of thousands of payments to the
doctors who would act as a surrogate sales force as well as to the practicing
physicians who would receive the message. In other words, adoption of the
“publication strategy” required the company to pay physicians to either
recommend the prescription of Neurontin or to order Neurontin, in violation of
the federal anti-kickback regulations, according to the newly released court
documents.
A description of the various programs Parke-Davis used to make these
payments to physicians follows.
Consultants’ Meetings
A common trick used by Parke-Davis to funnel illegal payments to doctors
to encourage them to prescribe Neurontin off-label was through “consultants’”
meetings. Under this front, Parke-Davis invited doctors to dinners or
conferences and paid them to hear presentations about off-label uses of the
drug. Under the guise that these doctors were acting as consultants, Parke-Davis
sometimes, but not always, had the doctors sign bogus consulting agreements. At
these meetings, the company would give these doctors lengthy presentations
relating to Neurontin, particularly regarding off-label usage. Presentations
would be made by Parke-Davis employees or physician speakers hired by the
company for the purpose of promoting Neurontin, and questions relating to the
use of Neurontin would be solicited and answered. At some conferences, the
sponsoring organization or Parke-Davis intentionally posed questions to the
speakers about off-label use to insure that the doctors were exposed to such
information.
Parke-Davis would routinely analyze whether the consultants’ meetings were
successful in getting doctors to change their prescription writing practices. At
some meetings, the so-called consultants were asked directly if they would write
more Neurontin prescriptions as a result of the meeting. This question would
have been irrelevant if the actual purpose of the meeting was to receive the
consultants’ advice. Parke-Davis also routinely tracked consultants’ Neurontin
prescription writing practices after these meetings. Parke-Davis actually
analyzed whether the doctors they had paid had in fact written more Neurontin
prescriptions after the meeting, using market data purchased from third parties.
Medical Education Seminars
The court documents revealed another platform used by the company to pay
kickbacks to doctors to hear off-label promotion of Neurontin. These were
programs billed as Continuing Medical Education (CME) seminars. These
conferences and seminars were set up to appear to qualify for an exception to
the FDA’s off-label marketing restrictions which permits doctors to learn about
off-label uses of drugs at independent seminars. Such seminars, however, must be
truly independent of the drug companies. The companies may make “unrestricted
grants” for the purpose of a seminar, but may not be involved in formulating the
content of the presentations, picking the speakers or selecting who attends the
seminars. Parke-Davis retained third party companies to present seminars while
in fact retaining control of virtually every aspect of these events. The seminar
companies obtained Parke-Davis’ approval for all content presented at the
seminars. Parke-Davis also paid all expenses, including all the seminar
companies’ fees.
The company designed and approved the seminars, hand-picked the speakers,
approved the seminar presentations, previewed (in most cases) the contents of
the seminars prior to a presentation, selected the attendees based on their
ability and willingness to prescribe high quantities of Neurontin, evaluated the
presentations to make sure Parke-Davis’ “message” was appropriately
delivered, black-listed presenters whose presentations were not
sufficiently pro-Neurontin, and monitored the prescribing patterns of the
physicians who attended.
Grants and Studies
Parke-Davis also made outright payments, in the form of grants, to reward
demonstrated Neurontin advocates. Company sales managers identified key doctors
who actively prescribed Neurontin or programs which were willing to host
Neurontin speakers and encouraged such persons or programs to obtain
“educational grants” from the company. Parke-Davis’ sales people informed
leading Neurontin subscribers that significant advocacy for Neurontin would
result in the payment of large grants. These studies did not involve significant
work for the physicians. Often they required little more than collating and
writing up office notes or records. Parke-Davis frequently hired technical
writers to write the articles for which the “authors” had been given grants.
Payments to “Authors” of Ghost-Written Articles
Another method of paying off doctors for backing Neurontin was to pay
honoraria for the use of their names on scientific articles intended for
publication in various neurology and psychiatry journals, but actually
ghost-written by technical writers hired by Parke-Davis, which retained control
of all such articles. In 1996 Parke-Davis paid for at least 20 such articles,
most of which dealt with off-label use of Neurontin, and were placed according
to the company’s “publication strategy.” Naturally, Parke-Davis paid all
expenses in connection with these articles.
Once Parke-Davis and the technical writers conceived the articles, the
company and its outside firms attempted to find recognized Neurontin prescribers
whose names could be used as the authors of these articles. In some cases,
drafts of the articles were completed even before an “author” agreed to place
his or her name on the article. This even occurred in connection with case
histories that purported to describe the “author’s” personal treatment of actual
patients. The “authors” were paid an honorarium of $1,000 to lend their names to
these articles, and also were able to claim publication credit on their
professional resumes.
Speakers’ Bureau
Parke-Davis also formed a Speakers’ Bureau, another tactic to make large
and numerous payments to doctors who recommended Neurontin at teleconferences,
dinner meetings, consultants meetings, educational seminars, and other events.
These speakers repeatedly gave short presentations relating to Neurontin for
which they were paid anywhere from $250 to $3,000. Some speakers received tens
of thousands of dollars annually in exchange for recommending to fellow
physicians that Neurontin be prescribed, particularly for off-label uses.
Speakers who most zealously advocated Neurontin were hired most frequently for
speaking events, regardless of the fact that many of these events were billed as
independent medical education seminars where objective information was supposed
to be delivered.
Circumstantial and some direct evidence over the years suggests that the
behavior of Parke-Davis in the off-label promotion of Neurontin is not isolated,
but rather an integral part of the pharmaceutical industry’s marketing
practices. However, in the Health Research Group’s experience, the Neurontin
episode is the most complete and well documented case of off-label promotion to
ever come into public view. Because of the detail of fabrications, pay-offs,
manipulation, and their effect on Neurontin sales some widely held myths have
been shattered.
First, and perhaps the most important to the health and safety of
patients, is the belief that doctors are not fooled or influenced by drug
company promotional ploys such as gifts to attend medical meetings or expensive
meals. The evidence presented in the court documents unambiguously shows that
such schemes work. Congress recognized 40 years ago that a large proportion of
physicians in everyday practice have neither the training nor the background to
differentiate between a useful drug and a harmful one. This is why Congress
created a process by which the FDA approves drugs based on validated science—to
protect patients from worthless or dangerous drugs. But this says nothing about
the apparently substantial number of doctors who accepted kickbacks or bribes to
prescribe Neurontin for uses that had not been proven. The memorable words of
the inspector in the movie Casablanca—”I am shocked—shocked!” come to mind.
Second, the sacrosanct position of peer reviewed medical literature as a
vehicle for scientific exchange has been seriously damaged. The manipulation of
information about Neurontin that Parke-Davis exercised would astonish George
Orwell. In defense of the many physicians who try their best for patients by
diligently keeping up with the medical literature, there is no way for a doctor,
scientist, or medical journal editor to know if a study is a fabrication.
There are major differences between the way the FDA reviews clinical
trials as part of the new drug approval process and the process used by a peer
reviewed medical journal to accept a study for publication. The FDA bases its
drug approval decisions on its own review of the actual data submitted by a
manufacturer, not on published journal articles. The agency has a staff of
highly trained statisticians who do their own analyses of the manufacturer’s
data, thus ensuring that approval decisions are based on valid data. Also, the
agency has authority to inspect clinical sites in order to keep investigators
honest.
On the other hand, the editor of a peer reviewed medical journal must
accept the veracity of a study submitted for publication. The editor will send
the study to several peer reviewers for their recommendations, but these people
have other things to do, and may spend only a few hours on their review. Peer
reviewers also must accept the veracity of the underlying data presented in the
study. The journal editor has neither the authority nor the resources to inspect
clinical sites. This is a system that can be “gamed,” as documented in the court
papers about Parke-Davis’ Neurontin publication strategy.
The message for patients is that if you have been prescribed a drug for an
off-label use, the evidence supporting such a use may be good or it may be
fabricated. The doctor prescribing the drug may have based the decision to use
the drug on an expensive dinner, received a kickback or was bribed, or was
simply fooled by a fabricated medical journal article.
What You Can Do
If you or a family member receive Neurontin for a use not listed in the
FDA approved professional product labeling, discuss with your doctor the
continued need for taking Neurontin.
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