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Edi Cahyono's Page!
• Historical Analysis of State-Society Relations in Indonesia!
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MORE THAN JUST WATCHDOGS*
Reflections on the role Indonesian NGOs could play to enhance their civil society** Nico Schulte Nordholt, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands ***
Introduction NGOs are usually perceived as part of civil society and, thus, they do strengthen democracy. Such a view has become almost an axiom. Unfortunately, however, this view is based on a deep-rooted desire rather than on sufficient and convincing evidence. 1Therefore, before we start questioning what role Indonesian NGOs could play in the process of democratisation, i.e. in strengthening their civil society, we had better first problematise the assumed linkage(s) between [Indonesian] NGOs and civil society, casu quo democracy. Neglecting to do so would be naive and dangerous. Naive, because it does not force us to investigate thoroughly under what necessary conditions, NGOs could eventually conducively contribute to the desired processes; and dangerous because, by neglecting to problematise the assumed linkage(s), one would not pose (anymore) the crucial question: to what extent are NGOs, in terms of their own structure and ways of functioning, democratic in themselves? 2 Hence, can it be expected that NGOs will contribute to enhancing their civil society?Although it still may seem far too early to assess fully the history of last year, nevertheless, in this regard, the alleged relatively small role Indonesian NGOs [as a movement, not necessarily the individuals active within this movement] played during the '1998-revolution' should already lead to some modesty vis-à-vis proclaiming such a axiom. Since we are dealing with the realities of Indonesia's present and near-future, it seems valid to limit such a critical phrasing to the Indonesian context. [It might be very useful, though, to draw lessons from experiences elsewhere - foremost from countries which have gone through more-or-less similar processes of transformation: from a centrally-planned, authoritarian political economic system towards a more 'open-market' (neo-liberal) and - at least rhetorically - democratic society, such as some countries in Central and Eastern Europe]. Focussing on the Indonesian context we have to look at the past; since without a just and fair assessment of the role and position of Indonesian NGOs during the New Order we cannot foresee what role and function NGOs may fulfil at present and in the near-future. Obviously, the context in which NGOs now have to function has changed dramatically since the beginning of the 'Asian-flu' (in the case of Indonesia, since August 1997), and more so, since president Suharto 'stepped-aside' on 21 May, 1998. However, we have to question whether the context has already changed that fundamentally; and if so, in what direction? For the better or, perhaps, even for the worse in relation to the prospect of democracy for the Indonesian society(ties)? However, whatever changes have occurred - and we have to try to identify these changes as carefully as possible - the most important reason to look critically at Indonesian NGOs' past performances is because those very same NGOs, which at present may claim to be able to contribute to the process of democracy, all carry their own history, burdened by their actions and behaviour during Suharto's New Order and the transition period that followed. At the organisational level we have to pose the question to what extent the Indonesian NGO movement was critical of the "performance legitimacy" of Suharto's New Order; or, by and large, was an instrument of that same order? Indeed, during the eighties the capitalistic-democratic North 'discovered' the NGOs as a potential instrument in their striving for a global democratisation process (especially after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989). At the same time, the NGO movement, especially in the 'South', was also seen as an efficient instrument for development where the 'State' failed to function accordingly.3 INFID, the successor of INGI (which was established in 1985), can also be regarded as such a 'double-instrument', at least from the perspective of the (multilateral) international donor agencies. Although, obviously, I would not suggest that the Indonesian NGOs operating within the framework of INGI/INFID were 'invented' by the 'North', one can hardly deny that this kind of international collaboration was, at least, intended to contribute to the process of democratisation in Indonesia. Therefore, at this moment in time, it is important to know whether it did indeed function accordingly? Or, finally, must we admit that most of the NGOs [both Indonesian and the international ones supporting them] were also, by and large, caught in the same discourse of developmentalism, so cleverly applied by the technocrats of the New Order and their international financial allies that, indeed, these NGOs did legitimise the New Order? Of course, they did not legitimise its KKN (corruption, collusion and nepotism), but, perhaps, the fundamental, political-economic principles, derived from an adjusted Theory of Modernisation which prioritises development above institutions establishing a sound civil society.At the individual level we have also to pose such critical questions. Because, in most cases, the same NGO members who two, five or ten years ago acted and behaved in a particular way and, more importantly, towards each other - naturally in the context of the political situation at that time! - are the ones who have to now act. How reliable, how consistent and how trustful, in relationship to the cause of an Indonesian civil society, were all these people then? Hence, for what reason should one nowadays rely on them and trust their consistency and reliability in pursuing democracy by enhancing civil society? I am fully aware that such soul-searching questions - especially when put forward by an outsider - may be perceived as insulting and provocative. If so, I sincerely apologise! I have no wish, whatsoever, to hurt the feelings of this audience, many of whom I regard as sincere and very dedicated people and whom I wish to see as friends. However, I am also convinced that, at this crucial moment in time for Indonesian society, no one, at least no one who really matters to the democratic future of Indonesia, would be well served with an obligate, overoptimistic picture of the role Indonesian NGOs may play. Moreover, such a picture would not touch the fundamental issues at stake in Indonesia and would not assess the strengths and weaknesses of the NGO actors expected to participate in addressing such issues.For is it not true that democracy - by and large - can only be established by individuals who think inclusively and not exclusively, that is those who are also taking into account the interests of those not (directly) belonging to their own regional, ethnic and religious circles; who are longing for accountability of actions taken and for openness of mind to listen to other opinions? Who, in their own decision-making processes, act transparently, and hence do not act on the basis of a 'multi-agenda'? And, isn't it true that democracy can only flourish by the acts of individuals who are willing to look for fair compromises in the best interests of all? If so, then, would it not be better if such actors prove their sincerity by their willingness to exercise a fair and critical look at themselves? Not as a clinical, academic judgement, but as a basis for a sound assessment of the question whether, and in what way, Indonesian NGOs, carrying their past successes and failures, can contribute to the desired process of enhancing civil society. From the outset, let me state that such a contribution should be, and I am convinced can be, more than just the role of a watchdog. 4 In order to justify this statement, I will outline the following structure:Firstly, I will very briefly present a working definition of the concept of civil society as applied in this analysis. Secondly, I will, also very concisely, refer to the content of the discourses as used in developmentalism and democracy/civil society, during the last three decades in Indonesia. Thirdly, within the framework of such a discourse analysis, I will describe the transformation of the political arena, from Suharto's New Order to the present, by presenting three charts which analyse the role and position of the Indonesian NGOs. After this I will, fourthly, formulate some fundamental issues Indonesian civil society has to deal with; and then, finally, I will draw a rough sketch of future actions to be taken:- the role Indonesian NGOs can fulfil.1. Civil society: a working definition 5There is no single, generally accepted meaning of the concept of civil society. In Indonesia a co-speaker at this conference, Dr Muhammad AS Hikam, is the specialist in this field. He will, no doubt, elaborate on the concept and analyse its consequences for the role of Indonesian NGOs. Therefore, I will restrict myself to a working definition offering me the clearest, i.e. the sharpest, analysis, to problematise the presumed positive contribution NGOs could offer in strengthening their civil society/ casu quo democracy. This definition I have derived from a political scientist from India, Neera Chandoke. 6 First she says that the concept of civil society bears the meaning of space or, sphere, while it also refers to actors. It refers to that space/sphere which, by means of a public critical rational discourse, is, as it were, 'filled' by actors, and is 'stretched' causing the society to become more democratic. That means that more actors can become part of that public space/sphere, and also that this public sphere, and then especially the institutions of the state, will become more democratic (the 'stretching' of the space). Here the dimension of inclusiveness is emphasised, alongside the nature of the institutions. Unconditionally, though, this means that the content of that discourse should explicitly relate to norms and values aimed at a process of democratisation. So not every discourse by whatever actor within the NGO sphere is, by definition, part of the civil society discourse. It depends on the content!First such a discourse should address norms and values relating to basic human rights7; but also those of accountability and openness/ transparency (commonly brought together in the term 'good governance') and inclusivity. Furthermore, according to Chandoke, this discourse should be aimed at the State so that, within that state, democratic basic values will be institutionalised. For only within a democratic state will a guarantee exist for the further development of a civil society. This again is a result of the essential characteristic of nearly all actors within the state-sphere to limit the scope of space for democratic actors and hence to curtail civil society. Civil society and democracy should not be considered as independent of each other, but neither do they coincide. To an extent one may say that civil society is the watchdog of a democratic state, but, and this is my thesis, at the same time it ought to be more: a civil society creates democracy. To acquire democracy the actors within a civil society, through public critical rational discourse, should bring about the democratic norms and values within the state (public sphere) with the purpose of further democratising them. Here we see another dimension of 'discourse'; it is not restricted to the content of words, it is also directly related to acts. The consequence of this definition of civil society is that those actors who claim to belong to a civil society, but do not act according to the four criteria mentioned (basic human rights; accountability; openness/transparency and inclusivity), do not fall under the concept meant here by civil society. Public , here, means that the discourse is conducted not only in an open and transparent manner, but also, on purpose, is addressed to the public, preferably by using the media as widely as possible, hence not only intended for ones own 'ummat' or, 'parish'.Critical , here, means that the discourse (words and actions) should not only focus on promoting democratic values, but also should critically assess to what extent the concept/programmes applied contain severe discrepancies between the 'norm' and 'reality'. Hence, the question is: how reliable, valid and consistent is the discourse itself viewed from the perspective of democratic values?Rational, here, means that the democratic values, based on argument, are sought by persuasion. Violence, therefore, is rejected. The force of argument should be of paramount importance: rallies and mass demonstrations as 'arguments', are not enough. On the contrary, they are counter-productive when accompanied by violence or the threat of violence. As far as that latter is concerned (the function of mass demonstrations) it might be too early to make a full assessment of the '1998-revolution', but it would, however, be useful if, within the Indonesian NGO movement, some form of introspection took place on the question to what extent rational arguments instead of the 'masses' played a roll during that period of transition. Within this definition of civil society institutions are indeed also of importance. But formal structures or procedures for democracy alone are not sufficient. Hence, elections as such are insufficient, albeit necessary. It is the content that is important, the norms and values, and, above all, acting according to these values and norms. Hence, the important question is what was the position of the NGOs when, at the end of 1998 and the beginning of 1999, three new bills were rushed through the DPR? Based on the latest information I have received, at present INFID, and its related NGOs, have taken the lead in opposing the drafting of the new Law on National Security, regarding its content as fundamentally directed against the basic values of civil society. Such an action fits in well as a necessary first step towards building the required awareness of civil society. Further, this definition especially points at the danger of a 'thick tongue', casu quo that of the 'multi-agenda' 8 As it happens, such a 'multi-agenda' leads essentially to an erosion of democratic concepts. If there was to be a list of the sad heritage of 32 years of Suharto's New Order, then this erosion of norms and values should be ranked very high.2. Discourse: developmentalism versus democracy/civil society In 1981 I wrote my PhD thesis with the Dutch title: Opbouw in opdracht of Ontwikkeling in overleg? [Construction on command or Development based on consensus?].9 In fact, the thesis dealt with, amongst other things, the problem as to what extent the first two Five Year Plans of the New Order could be seen as Pembangunan or Perkembangan. At that time (1978-1981), I thought it still relevant to question whether "the language used" by the New Order, which in its phrasing sounded very democratic, in practice did contain democratic characteristics. A few years later, Ariel Heryanto wrote a very enlightening article about the same contradiction: Pembangunan versus Perkembangan (in: Prisma, 1988), and concluded that the hegemonic ideology of the New Order's Pembangunan (Construction on command) had already overruled whatever democratic traits existed before within Indonesian society. The rhetoric of that 'democratic' language, derived from the general contemporary international jargon of the theory of Modernisation, supplemented with some Indonesian terms, did not at the time appeal only to me in a certain way. Nearly all Indonesian NGOs at that time did not question the validity of the terms: Delapan Penyalur Pembangunan [The Eight Ways to Development] and People's Participation. During those years the NGO movement received an enormous impulse from the NKK decision (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus- Normalisation of Campus Life) by the government in 1978. Because of this, many students who could not vent their critical energy within the student organisations became active within NGOs. But it was not for long since their critical attitudes were nearly entirely absorbed by the demands from their new operating environment: to raise funds and to carry out projects. Even the most critical among them virtually exclusively put their criticism in terms of "corrections to the mistakes made during implementation of the Repelita" [Five Year Plans]. The plans themselves, and in particular the political-economic mechanisms underpinning them, were at that point not a major topic of discussion. If they were raised then only by very few. Most, lacking any form of criticism, were supporters of the programmes themselves, hoping to receive assignments within the framework of those very programmes. Considering their historic background, and the organisational structure of most NGOs, this should be no surprise. In the seventies and eighties the critical position mainly related to the use of the term participation. The New Order introduced this international contemporary concept, but in fact only meant participation in implementation, not in planning and decision making, and within certain limits (decided by the government) participation in the benefits of the various development projects. The inherent connotation of power within the concept of participation was categorically denied by the New Order, and hardly put forward by the NGO movement. The notion that participation could lead to empowerment was something which only came to the fore in the late-eighties. By and large, within those circles, it was accepted that participation of 'grass root level' organisations was an objective worth aiming for in itself. Primarily to increase the efficiency of the development programmes as such, rather than to empower the weaker sections of society in the decision-making processes. Partly, this was due to the assumption that 'the NGOs', in comparison to the government, better represented the interests of the 'grass-root organisations', or, for that matter, the 'target groups'. The distinction within the concept of participation, more commonly made in the professional literature (cf.: Uphoff; Nelson and Wright) 10 during the nineties, between "the power to" and "the power over", to my knowledge, appeared hardly at all in NGO discourses on development in Indonesia.A similar critique can be formulated in regard of the way the state ideology, pancasila, was enforced in Indonesian society as a whole [from 1978 onwards, resulting in the Social Act, Law Number 8,1985]. Within certain religious circles the reaction to this enforcement was based on principles but, by and large, the general attitude of the Indonesian NGOs can be described as an "avoiding confrontation with the State". Such a survival strategy can be respected in the context of the political arena at that time. In hindsight, however, one may conclude that in so doing the NGO movement was not prepared, and did not react assertively to the way in which the New Order manipulated SARA. [SARA: a prohibition on speaking out publicly on issues related to Sosial, Agama, Ras, Antar-golongan = social, religious, race and socio-economic tensions]. The instrument of SARA, based on the New Order's interpretation of the pancasila, was intended to maintain its power over Indonesian society. Only after May 1998 did I come across a fundamental criticism of this manipulation of SARA ( "Pluralisme Agama di Tengah Krisis Orde Baru" [ Religious pluralism amidst the New Order Crisis] Th. Sumartono, 1999, unpublished paper). The importance of this observation, in regard of the concept of civil society, is that Indonesian society was indoctrinated by a state the ideology of which, in practice, divided its members in order to rule them without much opposition. The NGO movement, in general, did not oppose this misuse of ideology, which, in its original meaning, is probably the most effective one to bind together such a heterogeneous society as inhabits the Indonesian Archipelago. Perhaps most harrowing from the perspective of the contribution of the NGO movement to the process of democratisation is the establishment of ICMI [Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals] and its negative effects on collaboration within NGO circles. In a recent article ("Civil Society dalam Era Kegelisahan" [Civil Society in the Era of Chaos] BASIS, March/April, 1999) I highlighted the relationship between the 'decline' of LP3ES and the first-class monthly PRISMA, and the rise of ICMI. There are numerous other examples, but this is not the place to go into this any deeper. Besides, recent history, the downfall of Suharto's New Order and the year of transition that followed, has yet to be studied thoroughly and written about in detail. But as much as this seems clear: in the nineties the NGO movement became internally more divided than before, partly because of the cunning way the state linked political-ideological interests to social-religious aspects within society. Because the NGO movement was not trained for a debate on principles regarding the content of the developmental discourse, it more became a victim of this manipulative action from SARA rather than being able to go against it effectively. Two other themes, next to developmentalism, also stood central within the discourse of the NGOs: human rights, including labour issues, and environmental issues. But the way in which these themes were dealt with, was to a large extent a matter of correcting the deviations of the New Order, rather than a fundamental complaint against the principles that underlay that New Order. Therefore, it seems, the New Order could maintain its grip on society alone, due to a lack of a principled opposition. Meuthia Ganie is presently preparing a PhD thesis at the University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands, on the advocacy role of the Indonesian NGO movement during Suharto's New Order. In her analysis she considers the difference between protest-making (when the advocacy is against misuse of the law by those in power) and claim-making (where no law yet exists, but should exist based on a sense of universal values). Such a distinction seems to be very useful in sharpening our understanding of the, relatively marginal, role NGOs played during the New Order in respect to the two themes mentioned.Also with regard to another aspect of the state's hegemony in matters of ideology it seems that the NGO movement acted too passively and too late. As far as the recent history of the New Order is concerned - from Sabtu Kelabu, (Grey Saturday 27 July, 1996), followed by the numerous 'Situbondos' (allegedly religious violent conflicts) until the recent conflicts in Aceh, The Moluccas, Irian Jaya and East Timor - in all these cases one can speak of similar SARA manipulations. It is clear that all those conflicts were part of an internal battle for power within the political centre of the state. This internal battle for power was, and unfortunately we have to conclude still is, fought out within the many conflicts and tensions that have arisen within society, ironically, precisely as a result of the development model used in the New Order. In itself it is quite normal that within a society during such an accelerated process of social and economic transformation conflicts arise. This happens all over the world, even in advanced, post-industrial, countries, but the core issue here - regarding civil society - is whether conflicts like these can be resolved by forces within society itself. The SARA policy of the New Order was (and it seems still is) meant to prevent development of such conflict management capacities within society itself. The New Order, backed by its Armed Forces, pretended to be the only power able to solve the occurring conflicts (often after self-designed incidents). Only in early 1998, with the foundation of KONTRAS, did consistent and counter action slowly emerge from the NGO movement. Since then this counter action seems to have got more political clout, but one has also to admit that since the middle of 1998 the freedom of press has also increased considerably. Because of this increased 'freedom of speech' nowadays one needs relatively less courage to protest against comparable manipulation by state institutions, compared to the previous period. By noting KONTRAS, and not forgetting the various similarly oriented NGOs, we see a good example of an NGO that can be more than just a Watchdog. The way KONTRAS is organised and operates, based on a purposefully designed inclusiveness, makes it a good example for an embryonic civil society, based on to the definition of Chandoke. 3. Transformation of political arenas The objective of this schematic representation of the transformation of the political arena of the New Order is twofold. Firstly, to visualise how a seemingly very stable political regime can erode by a process of atomisation into national disintegration; and, secondly, to outline the relatively small role and position NGOs fulfilled within such a transformation process. It should be noted that these three charts were originally drawn to explain Indonesia's political arena in the context of a broader analysis (and primarily for a Dutch audience). Hence, much of their content does not relate directly to the twofold objective stated above. Nevertheless, hopefully, the charts will serve as a kind of 'shorthand' to answer the question stated in the introduction to this paper, that is, whether the Indonesian NGOs did fulfil a significant role in the transformation process, or did they just play a role in the margin of events? Naturally, a more elaborated legend should be added in order to understand all the details, but such an explanation would distract from the main point of argument. From all the charts it is clear that the NGOs are rather marginal relative to the truly important actors within the political arena. The third chart, a graphical representation of the political parties in relation to the Armed Forces, shows not only the very marginal position of NGOs in this regard but also the pivotal position the Army fraction still seems to occupy. I am fully aware that such a (probably rather provocative) statement could be challenged. However, I would rather be accused of overestimating the role of the Army-fraction rather than the opposite. The same counts, mutatis mutandis, for the role of the NGOs. Three charts: 4. Fundamental issues to deal with The crisis Indonesia is facing today, sadly enough, is broader and deeper than just a financial-economic one. In perhaps rather dramatic terms one may say that the future of Indonesia is at stake. The present process of social disintegration may evolve further into national disintegration. The essence of the Indonesian crisis, as I see it, can be formulated as four main problems: (1) The political-ideological base of the Indonesian nation-state has to be re-affirmed: there seems no longer to be a broadly endorsed consensus on this question. Within the present political arena protagonists for either a secular pancasila, or one with a religious basis can be observed. Does this matter from the point of view of a civil society as defined above, and if so, what position is adopted by the NGO movement in Indonesia? How important Dual Function is, in itself, as a political issue, seems to primarily a point of practical politics: how to organise - within what time span and at what costs - getting the army back into the barracks. It is not a matter of principle, if viewed from the point of civil society: civilians have to control the functioning of the generals. (2) The political-administrative structure of the state is already questioned in political circles. The question for the NGO movement should be which structure would best fit the interest of the heterogeneous communities of the large nation - a continuation of the present unitarism (including new legislation on local autonomy) or a (gradual) change towards federalism or unionism? (3) Due to the major crisis Indonesia is facing a restructuring of the economy is deemed necessary. It is obvious that this does not only include technical aspects such as restructuring the banking system, however important this may be as part of the values of transparency and accountability! Restructuring of the economy also includes, in administrative terms (related to the above issue), a fair and just redistribution of revenues between the centre and regions; and also a fair and just distribution between the various sectors of administration, including the Armed Forces (as a protective shield for the nation). Without a fair and just redistribution no sustained development of the various societies within this large nation can be achieved. Restructuring of the economy also has a social-economic dimension: who will get access to, and control over, the financial and economic resources (including the tremendous amount of natural resources)? This aspect is directly related to the value of inclusiveness. In this regard the present and future position of the Chinese business community is directly at stake. If, within a public critical rational discourse, this issue is put on the agenda then the democratic quality of the actors can be measured by the extent to which inclusiveness is striven for. For instance, if, as is presently popular in Indonesia, the concept of Ekonomi Kerakyatan (the people's economy) is propagated one can assess its democratic quality by, at the same time, questioning to what extent "people's democracy" is also propagated. Also whether, within the latter concept, all Indonesians including for instance Indonesians of Chinese origin really – rather than virtually (casu quo Riggs "formalism") - do belong to the Indonesian nation should be assessed. Of equal importance is whether they have the same rights and responsibilities in such a concept. If a full consensus on this matter does not exist misinterpretations will arise. For instance, members of certain communities will regard themselves as victims and may look for other political strategies, including the use of violence. This brings us to the fourth main issue: who fully belongs to the future Indonesian society?(4) This problem of identity lies at the heart of civil society discourse and, hence, should be given full attention by the NGO movement if it regards itself as part of such a civil society. 5. Future actions Based on the outline given above it becomes clear that if NGOs are expected to contribute towards enhancing civil society, in casu, and be more than just a watchdog, that this can only be achieved if the NGOs are aware of the prerequisites of the concept of civil society as outlined in section 1. This implies that Indonesian NGOs have to do quite some homework first. This paper hopes to contribute to that task. To become acquainted with the method of public critical rational discourse, NGO actors not only have to acquire the necessary knowledge and insights to pursue the four basic values of civil society, they also need to reflect these values in their attitudes and actions. This means, that NGOs ought to rethink their structures and ways of organising their programmes.This does not only apply to the orientation of the programmes (either directed to its own 'ummat' or 'parish', or focused on the community regardless of its composition in relation to these dimensions). It is also of importance in respect to the internal organisational structures of NGOs themselves: do members of minority groups have a chance to fulfil leading positions? In other words, the NGOs, as a movement, striving for the basic values of a civil society should regard themselves, foremost, as a laboratory for training its members appropriately before they participate within the different sectors and segments of society.However, this argument does not imply that NGOs have to reformulate the themes of their programmes and actions as such. Those who have accumulated expertise in certain fields, such as welfare and socio-economic development, should not refrain from these fields. In the midst of the present severe crisis, all their accumulated expertise is fully necessary. But, if in its implementation the orientation, as explained above, is not adjusted then the desired civil society will remain as far from realisation as ever. A thorough awareness of the satanic manner of manipulation of SARA, as an instrument in the hands of those in power, may strengthen the NGO movement en masse. Only if armed with such awareness can NGO actors subsequently become sisters/brothers-in-arms to strive together with other actors in society for such a goal. If not, they may easily become victims of manipulation as, sadly, has happened more than once in the recent past. Once again, the point is not that, from now on, the entire NGO movement has to execute a different programme altogether. On the contrary, particularly now during the deepest crisis Indonesian society has seen over the last thirty years, the need for NGOs aimed at relieving primary need (the classical welfare and socio-economic development programmes) has risen tremendously. However it does imply that if the NGO movement is willing to contribute to strengthening Indonesian civil society, it will have to execute their classical programmes differently. In this context it will also be of the highest importance if, next to the classical NGO programmes, the number of NGOs specifically aiming at strengthening civil society increase, both qualitatively as well as quantitatively. This will be a relatively long-winded process but, at the same time, such a direct programme aimed at strengthening civil society is of the utmost urgency. Here we should distinguish clearly a number of dimensions (aspects). First, above all, it is a process of awakening Indonesian NGOs. International NGOs have supporting value, but no more than that. They can never take over or replace the role and final responsibility of the Indonesian NGOs. On the contrary, they should constantly be aware of the double-edged character of their relationship pattern. On the one hand international NGOs are a resource, in the material sense (as providers of funds) as well as in a non-material sense through providing contact with "different worlds", through which concepts and ideas are transferred. But at the same time this leads to the dilemma of the double character: how to avoid the pitfall that in offering funds there is nearly always a conditionality of facts, ideas developed in the west are pushed forward as well? That this possibility is very real is proven by the strength of (neo-)liberal thinking that, in all sorts of forms, has been raging over the planet these recent decades. Globalisation is the catchword, but the influence of the many ideological concepts of this model is, as yet, hardly recognised - according to Suzan George 11 neither by NGO actors or by scientists either.In 1989 Alfred Stephan had already forcefully pointed out that liberalisation does not automatically lead to democratisation12; this, according to Suzan George, has clearly not penetrated the minds of the leaders of the World Bank and the IMF. In this context it is very interesting that INFID considers that it should focus especially on lobby activities with both these institutions. These can be called claim-making actions on behalf of the democratisation of Indonesian society. But now, after the elections, new political parties have manifested themselves within the polemical arena claiming to be able to look after the political interests of their constituencies. INFID (casu quo the entire NGO movement) will have to redefine its position vis-à-vis the new political actors. To what extent can NGOs now that they, through more-or-less free elections, have formed into political parties claim that they look after the political interests of 'the people'? I think that this has become completely impossible, or even superfluous, but it seems very important to me that this original claim is repeated. If it were not, the NGO movement would run the risk of losing its legitimacy towards its own people.A second point of interest in this context is the denial that NGOs are not only working in different fields but also at different levels. The heterogeneous character can be a weakness, but can also be turned into an asset when the complementary character of that diversity is consciously used. The instrument here is networking. Not only horizontally, but especially vertically. But here, yet again, the issues should be content and objectives: for what purposes and in whose interest should such networking be established? Once again the structures of such a network should reflect the value of inclusivity. For obvious reasons not all grass-root level organisations are in a position to reflect such an inclusivity in their organisational structure, but, if they stay within their own 'ummat' or 'parish' when they network, these NGOs will strengthen primordialism rather than a civil society. Thus, much depends on the openness of higher level NGOs (regional and (international), as to whether the various programmes conducted at the local level can be regarded as a viable contribution to enhancing civil society in Indonesia.Networking, as a rather loosely structured mode of co-operation between actors who 'join forces' without losing their own identity may be the appropriate method to strengthen civil society. However, here again, it is not the method in itself that has merits, these only occur when the objectives are clearly directed at pursuing basic values such as the foundation of a public, critical, rational discourse. When such an objective is focused on enhancing trust within a society torn apart, then networking as a mode of co-operation may function as the necessary mortar for a civil society. Further operationalisation of these thoughts should be elaborated by the Indonesian NGOs. Hopefully, the present conference will provide ample opportunities for its participants to begin such an effort. Insya'Allah.
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