by Joe Hanink
August 1997
Introduction
Most people believe in the existence of God. Though there is
disagreement about what God is like, most people do belong to some
sort of organized religion. However, religious beliefs are not
always matters of demonstrative, analytic proof, but more often of
revelation and faith. Indeed, there is probably only a small
minority that have studied this question seriously. And for most, it
is not essential to have such a proof, since their faith is proof
enough. However, for others who have not yet conferred the truth in
their hearts into an assent of the mind, the process of discovering
God may be helped with rational arguments, such as those I shall
discuss here.
Many persons who believe in God do not also believe that the
existence of God can be analytically proved. Much less likely is it
for one who professes a disbelief in God to think that any such
proof exists or is even possible. However, it has been curious to me
that people turn to atheism, for this position actively claims that
there is no God. Since we cannot thoroughly perceive God in a
tangible way, this can be a reason to withhold belief, but this
cannot be a good reason by itself to actively disbelieve. Some of
the self-professed atheists say that there is not sufficient
evidence to warrant a belief in God. But if it is evidence that they
feel is lacking, what conclusive evidence is there that God does not
exist? To show that a thing does not exist, it must be done through
some sort of logical contraproof, such as showing that the notion of
God's existence is logically incompatible with something else known
to exist. And without such a proof, there is no more reason to
disbelieve than to believe. Therefore, many self-professed atheists
should really say that they are agnostic.
On the other hand, there are those who do have a carefully formed
belief that God does not exist, often arguing that the existence of
evil is incompatible with the existence of God. And since evil is
known to exist, they say that God cannot. This, of course, is deemed
inadequate, in part because the notion of evil is only properly
definable in the context of the notion of some absolute good, which
is synonymous with the notion of God, and there is also an
explanation for evil consistent with the existence of an
all-powerful and good God: Evil would never come
from God, so it must come from somewhere else. It cannot come from
created things that have no ability to choose, because then it would
really be caused ultimately by God. Therefore, evil must have come
into being from creatures that have personal freedom, a freedom so
authentic that it allows the creature to be an effrontery to its
creator. And God allows this not for the love of evil, but for the
love of his creatures. By allowing his creatures to be free, he
allows them to experience the ability to truly love one another and
their God. But a freedom that does not also allow disobedience is
not freedom at all. With Freedom comes the ability to choose, and
with choice comes the potential for Good and Evil. This evil
is not God's doing, but our own. Hence, the existence of Evil is not
a contraproof for the existence of God, and thus, as far as I can
tell, there is still no reason for anything less than agnosticism.
Even better than the conclusion that Evil does not disprove God's
existence, it seems that the existence of Evil should support
the theory for the existence of God: Since there is
evil, there must also be an Absolute Good, on which to define the
meaning of that evil, lest it not really be evil in any
consistent sense. Since we create evil, we ourselves are evidence of
a God who chooses to give us such freedom as to be able to obey and
disobey (disobedience to God's will being one way of
describing evil) according to our own will. Our freedom is a good
thing in itself, but the greatest object of our freedom, to exercise
our minds and hearts to honor our creator, the true source of
freedom, is a higher good. The ability to choose to love our God,
even given the choice to do evil is a wondrous gift, and the more we
recognize this, the better we are able to serve our Lord. It is in
our ability to do either good or evil that our freedom resides.
Thus, the fact that evil exists is, in a way, a testament to God's
existence. In fact, the pure notions of both good and evil seem to
presuppose some absolute measures or standards for these concepts,
without which, the concept of evil (along with all its
connotations) would serve no purpose and have no meaning.
The preceding attempts to reinforce the compatibility of the
existence of evil and the existence of God. It does not indisputably
prove the existence of God, since it supposes that evil logically
depends on the existence of absolute goodness, and this supposition
is assumed, rather than proved. But in this scheme, the existence of
God is at once considered compatible with and necessary for the
existence of evil, and since there is evil, we then suppose the
existence of that Absolute Goodness, which we recognize as God.
In heavy contrast to the Atheists, who believe that there are
strong reasons to disbelieve, there are some who believe that there
are bona-fide proofs for the existence of God. And this is a
significant thought, for in mathematics, a proof is the srongest
form of persuasion, for it means that the statement is and must be
true, beyond any doubt. If there is an actual proof for the
existence of God, then there follows a natural & compelling
reason to be religious. Actually, most people would say that proving
a thing won't move too many people, and that those that already
believe won't show any more enthusiasm, so the audience for this
type of proof is probably very small. Some will take interest out of
curiosity and nothing more, but there will be a handful for whom
this might be very helpful. And for those, this essay becomes
entirely worthwhile.
>> The
Argument from Contingency
Everything in existence can be divided into two categories of
existence, either necessary or contingent. A contingent thing is
one which does not possess the principle of necessary existence.
Its existence is owed to the existence of other things. And it is
clear that contingent things exist. All contingent beings depend
on other beings for their existence. Those other beings must
themselves be either necessary or contingent. The line of
contingent beings goes into the past indefinitely, but not
forever. Indeed, it is logically incoherent to suppose a line of
contingent beings going infinitely into the past. This would
constitute an infinite regression, which is mathematically /
logically impossible. From most accountings, it is not even a
coherent notion, meaning that it the combination of words doesn't
point to anything that makes any real sense. There are actual
infinities, but there cannot be an infinite string of causal
events into the past. Therefore, the line of contingencies must
have a beginning, and, by definition, the first contingent cannot
be dependent on another contingent, implying that its predecessor
must be a necessary being. This necessary being, we call God, who
has the principle of necessary existence, not created nor
contingent on anything else, having always been and will always
be.
The foregoing argument for the existence of God is called the
argument from contingency, and upon review, it is rather simple. It
says that there are contingent things, that contingent things depend
on other things for their existence, which are themselves either
contingent or necessary, but since there cannot be an infinite
regression of contingent beings backward in time, then there must be
a necessary being to initiate the sequence, whom we call God. There
is no escape from this reasoning, which therefore constitutes a
proof for the existence of God. As for the nature of the divine
being, besides the property of necessary existence, nothing else is
shown directly by this argument. In the unity of truth, however,
other things may be logically derived, but I do not attempt to make
any such derivations here. Hopefully, I have presented this in a
satisfactory way and have shown how the conclusion follows
logically. I'm sure that there are some disputations to this, but I
cannot perceive any through my own reflection. Please send remarks
to jhanink@usa.net
There are other arguments which claim to give proof for the
existence of God, and I have reviewed several, but few of them seem
to be more than a simple exercise in open-mindedness, giving the
reader some (good) reasons to believe, rather than showing why the
reader must believe. Such arguments can help bolster the
faith of a believer, but will normally not serve to persuade one who
does not already believe. There is, however, one other argument for
the existence of God that I know of, which I believe is successful
as a logical proof. This one is harder to understand, but may serve
as a supplement for those interested in this matter. It is called
the Ontological Argument and comes from St. Anselm.
The Ontological Argument is somewhat tricky, and it will probably
be confusing at first, since it has the appearance of being
circular, and while some theologians and philosophers do accept this
as a valid proof, there are many arguments that say otherwise. I
believe that this argument does succeed as a proof. But I would be
surprised if it succeeded in persuading too many people, on account
of its oddity. At any rate, I will try to explain it as best as I
can. The ideas contained next are from some time past, and I have
decided not to make the effort to edit it significantly.
One final thing I would like to mention here is the fact that the
actual statement that constitutes Anselm's position is very short.
It is striking that such a short statement could engender such
powerful resistance and serious study as this one has. It is itself
just a statement, and it is really his explanation of the statement
that serves as his argument for the existence of God. It is in the
correct understanding of the statement that we are to look for the
proof.
>> The
Ontological Argument
Thursday, April 29, 1993
Regarding St. Anselm's
Ontological Argument
Section I
Part of what we mean by "God" is "that
than which nothing greater can be conceived." It
is said that we have an idea of God in our minds. And it seems
that having an idea of a thing is for that thing to exist in some
way in our mind. Let us say that to be in actuality is greater
than to be only in the mind, intuitively similar to the way we
place higher value on a real dollar than a mere I.O.U. If we can
postulate the actual existence of God, then we would say that for
God to exist in actuality is greater than for God to exist solely
in our minds. If God really is "that
than which nothing greater can be conceived,"
then, given two options, God must be the greater. Then, here, God
must actually be, for that is greater than to be only in the mind.
Some of the strongest oppositions against Anselm's argument come
from the German philosopher, Immanuel Kant. It is therefore
appropriate to address his claims if we are honestly interested in
seeking the truth.
Section II
Immanuel Kant claims that to say that existence is necessary
does not suffice to show that it is indeed so. I agree that such
an assertion does not by itself suffice. Kant says,
The absolute necessity of the
judgment is only a conditioned necessity of the thing, or of the
predicate in the judgment.
If we consider a triangle, this entails that the world isn't
forced to contain three geometric angles, but that, under the
condition that triangles exist, three angles will necessarily be
found in it. This states that the properties of a thing do not
exist unless the object exists, and that if the object does not
exist, then no discussion of its imagined properties is pertinent.
I would say that three angles are necessary to the concept of a
triangle, independent of the thing's actual existence, just as the
concept of a unicorn can be understood despite their fictional
nature. The necessity of the relationship between triangularity
and triangles is unconditioned. Indeed, this is tautological. If
this were not so, then we could not speak of a triangle without
first positing one. For Kant, "positing," seems to mean,
"asserting the existence of," as indicated by various
statements of his, which would imply that "a merely
theoretical triangle" would not have meaning.
To reject a would-be real triangle is to reject the would-be
real angles associated with that triangle. But the association
between triangularity and the concept of a triangle perdures. That
is, a necessary, internal relationship (or predicate) is not
broken through rejection of the object entire. As long as we have
a concept of the thing, the definition persists, and the thing
then exists "in some way" in our minds... just as the
ontological argument states. It could not have this "formal"
existence, as such, if the defining concepts, necessary to the
notion of the "mental" object, did not exist. If this
mental object did not exist, then we would not be able to conceive
of it in our minds. It is clear that we can conceive of triangles,
and, therefore, the mental object (with its predicates) must also
exist.
Perhaps Kant's strongest argument on this issue is here,
To posit a triangle, and yet to
reject its three angles, is self-contradictory; but there is no
contradiction in rejecting the triangle together with its three
angles. The same holds true of the concept of an absolutely
necessary being. If its existence is rejected, we reject the
thing itself with all its predicates; and no question of
contradiction can then arise.
Kant argues that existence as a predicate would be washed aside
by rejection of the thing itself. In other places, he argues that
existence cannot be a predicate at all, which is slightly
suspicious. But there is a basic divergence in opinion for Kant
and myself, in that he does not believe that the necessary,
internal relationships in a coherent concept must remain, even in
the absence of an instance of such an object. But, providing that
I am correct, that the relationships given by the definition of a
thing are meaningful independently of an actual instance of one,
then if necessary existence is made part of the definition of a
thing, then that thing must exist. Thus, if our concept involves
the necessity of existence, we cannot merely reject that
particular object, as we could in the case of the triangle, for
which necessary existence is not part of its definition. Though we
can reject the triangle because none of its properties demanded
that it exist, we cannot reject the necessary relationship between
object and properties, since if we are to speak about a thing,
those terms are meaningful insofar as the definitions have
meaning. Furthermore, it seems clear that we can have a coherent
concept of a triangle without at first positing the existence of
one, just as I can speak of triangles without drawing one
beforehand.
Where existence is necessary, existence is obviously demanded,
precluding rejection. Hence, Kant is wrong in the statement,
The same holds true of the concept
of an absolutely necessary being. If its existence is rejected,
we reject the thing itself with all its predicates.
We cannot reject what is conceived to be absolutely necessary.
In short, his condition simply does not apply to the preceding
concept. Shortly afterwards in his essay, he makes what is
essentially this very same observation:
The only way of evading this
conclusion is to argue that there are subjects which cannot be
removed, and must always remain. That, however, would only be
another way of saying that there are absolutely necessary
subjects; and that is the very assumption which I have called in
question.
And, it seems that if Kant is ill-disposed to assumptions
(unsupported propositions) then he should not be making them, as
he does in the immediately foregoing sentence:
We have thus seen that if the
predicate of a judgment is rejected together with the subject,
no internal contradiction can result, and that this holds no
matter what the predicate may be.
It is precisely this that supporters of Anselm would dispute,
namely, Kant's assumption that his subject/predicate removal
applies "no matter what the predicate may be."
Further, he states,
I cannot form the least concept of
a thing which, should it be rejected with all its predicates,
leaves behind a contradiction; and in the absence of
contradiction I have, through pure a priori concepts alone, no
criterion of impossibility.
Besides my former argument against this, I propose another one,
more general and thus, perhaps, more persuasive:
The concept of truth cannot be formally rejected, for in
the attempt, one would prove it. That is, if I say that I reject
truth, I would unwittingly admit it, falling into contradiction,
for I would be implicitly asserting that the proposition, "there
is no truth," is true.
A stated rejection of truth is self-defeating; and it is
likewise so in the former discussion of necessary being, which
also cannot be rejected if the concept is to have coherence.
Philosopher and mathematician, Bertrand Russell, takes another
approach when he says that the phrase "God exists" is
incoherent, which is his way of arguing that the object entire can
be "rejected." But I dissent, for nothing is really
being rejected if the terms so arranged have no meaning. Russell
says in his debate with F. C. Coppleston that "necessary
being" has no meaning in the first place. He says that only
propositions can be necessary, and of the propositions,
only those that are analytic (which cannot be denied
without self-contradiction). I wonder if it would be possible to
devise a proposition about this argument, and attempt to make it
analytic. Then, in order to address Bertrand Russel's position, we
needn't show that existence is required, but that the proposition
(about existence) is required. He goes on to argue that
a subject named can never be
significantly said to exist but only a subject described. And
that existence, in fact, quite definitely is not a predicate.
He would say that the proposition, "God exists" is not
analytic and thus cannot be necessary. I will not discuss this
matter, as I am not qualified to debate this type of argument.
However, I feel that my arguments above are sufficient to show
that the Ontological Argument is indeed a valid proof for the
existence of God. Maybe one day I'll be able to tackle Russel's
objections, but not today.
Please send your thoughts to jhanink@hotmail.com
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