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2. Roosevelt and the U.S. in Asia
 

 

In 1904 history presented a task for Roosevelt’s global approach. A war had erup- ted between Russia and Japan on competing ambitions in Manchuria and Korea. The United States had been expecting for some time a clash to occur between the two heavily expansionist nations that were soaring up into the circle of great powers. The sympathies of Roosevelt and his advisers were with Japan who seemed to be fighting America’s battle in putting an end to the Russian efforts of turning Manchuria into its exclusive, shut off sphere.

   But in spring 1905 Americans were shocked by the total defeat of the Russian navy by the Japanese fleet. Furthermore Japan’s power was reinforced by a 1902 alliance with Britain. Now the United States faced the urgent need to assure that Japan would not emerge as the predominant power in the Far East. Had he first hoped to safeguard the perseverance of the Open-Door Policy by rebalancing the influences with Japan’s help, Roosevelt now acted by inviting the warring parties to Ports- mouth, New Hampshire to work out a peace treaty.[96]
He, who loved war and conflict so much, later was awarded the Nobel peace prize for his efforts, but he did not succeed in restoring the pre-war status.[97]  The presi- dent had to concede to Japan a ‘Monroe-Doctrine for Asia’ which would assign to Japan a similar position and influence in China that the United States demanded for itself in the Western hemisphere.
His underlying „view of the world as made up of great powers which would be perpetual competitors but which could also cooperate to maintain stability and equilibrium in various regions of the world“[98] led him to negotiate a secret deal with Japan. In the ‘Taft-Katsura Agreement’ of 1905 Japan declared that it had no desire for the Philippines in return for which the USA pledged not to interfere in Korea. Shortly afterwards, Tokyo forced Korea to become a Japanese protectorate. [99] The Open-Door was no longer wide open...

   The price for this apparent return to stability in the Far East was upheaval else- where. The Russo-Japanese War had intensified the anger at the czar’s regime and in mid-1905 revolution broke out in Russia. The autocrat was still able to crush the uprising but the deterioration of Russian stability was not stopped. In 1917 revo- lution would finally be successful there and develop into an challenge for American power.[100]

   In China the war had a similar effect. The Japanese had shown that the European powers were not invincible for Asians. Their self-esteem strengthened, anti-foreign sentiments rose again and led to a boycott of U.S. products from 1905 on in protest of the discriminating American immigration policy. Some years later, revolution would erupt here as well.

  Roosevelt’s plan of restoring stability seemed to have shattered in pieces. The Japanese were now moving to seal of their spheres of influence and were severely angered over anti-Japanese riots in California and that state’s prohibition of Japa- nese immigration. In 1907 Roosevelt sent the entire American fleet on a round-the- world trip which was to impress Japan. It did score a large propaganda success, but didn’t help diplomacy. War between the two nations was considered possible, but contrary to Roosevelt’s power talk, the United States were neither willing nor able to challenge Japan in a war. And as the president knew the situation very well, he was
willing to sacrifice parts of the Open-Door Policy to maintain peace in the region considered so important for U.S. trade expansion. In the ‘Root-Takahira Agreement’ of 1908, the United States formally recognized Japan’s hold over Korea and Man- churia whereas Japan declared that it would uphold the principle of equal trade and Chinese independence, but refused to agree to territorial integrity of China. [101]  After all the Japanese were just taking the country apart.

   Nevertheless, Roosevelt obviously had proven right his statement, that concerning conflict among ‘civilized’ nations, „we have every reason ...to believe that [war] will grow rarer and rarer.“[102]  For ‘inferior’ people Theodore Roosevelt’s outlook was not so inspiring: „In the long run civilized man finds he can keep the peace only by subduing his barbarian neighbor.“[103]

 
 
 
 

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The American Century
An Online Experience in History
III. 2.  Roosevelt and the U.S. in Asia
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