A centerpiece of Captain Mahan’s concept of seapower had been an isthmian canal through Central America in order to increase the Navy’s mobility and thus power. Roosevelt himself now made it a primary objective of his foreign policy.

   In 1850 the U.S. and Great Britain had signed the ‘Clayton-Bulwer Treaty’ decla- ring that no single power was to have exclusive control over a canal; both powers should have a 50% stake in the venture.[114]

   But Roosevelt’s new course had reserved the Western hemisphere exclusively for American influence. He would have to get rid of the British, but did not want to ruin the rapprochement’s achievements of a better cooperation between the two powers. Senate had already taken measures to provide for the building of an American- controlled canal notwithstanding the ‘Clayton-Bulwer Treaty’. The British were at that time involved in an all out war against the Boers, Dutch settlers, in South Africa and had to take humiliating defeats. They were not willing to quarrel with Ameri- cans over a canal and agreed to terminate the treaty.[115]  The two nations signed the ‘Hay-Pauncefote Treaty’ in early 1900 that conceded to the United States the sole right to construct, control and maintain a canal linking the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans. The U.S. in return had to reaffirm that it would grant passage to all ships and not fortify the canal. The canal thus was to be an international waterway, open to peaceful commerce.[116]

   Although the objective seemed achieved, the public, the Senate and foremost the new President Theodore Roosevelt were upset. In their eyes American sovereignity had been sacrificed in giving up the right to fortify the canal zone. Their sense of self-confidence and nationalism combined with traditional hostility towards Britain in many parts of society led them to consider this a severe neglectance of national security.[117]  Since the new chief-executive offered the British -contrary to public sentiment - financial help in the Boer Wars, they were willing to sign a ‘Second Hay- Pauncefote Treaty’ in 1901 granting the United States full sovereignity in building
and securing the canal. A ‘Caribbean Squadron’ was immediately established that was to ensure ‘law and order’ in the isthmian region.[118]

   The next task would be to determine the route of the canal. Several U.S. companies had already acquired concessions to built a canal through Nicaragua. The Southern states favored this route as it was  closest to their ports. But there still was a French company that had earlier attempted to built a canal of its own through Panama (then a province of Colombia). Their good connections in Washington and heavy lobby- ing, the affirmations that their route would be less expensive and less complicated to built and finally the eruption of a volcano in Nicaragua, led Congress to give
Roosevelt the right to negotiate for a canal trough Panama.[119]

   No one in Washington had ever considered the political and economic implica- tions for Nicaragua or Colombia; total American sovereignity over the project was just pre-assumed. In 1903 a treaty was signed between the U.S. and Colombia that assigned to the United States a 10 km zone on each side of the canal for a one-time payment of $10 million and an annual rent of $250,000. But the Colombian Senate refused to accept the treaty. It hoped to gain more money for its civil-war shaken country and declared the treaty to be an infringement on Colombian sovereignity.

   Roosevelt was infuriated, his racism was touched by those Hispanic bandits who tried to rob the greatest nation on earth. His determination to build this canal led him to not shun the use of force. He uttered that he would welcome if the Panama- nian nationalist movement revolted.
He did not have to wait long for results. On November 3, 1903 an uprising erupted in the Colombian province of Panama. Roosevelt sent his ‘Big Stick’ - the navy - that prevented the Colombian troops from landing in Panama to quell the rebellion. U.S. managed railroad companies refused to provide transportation for the Colombians. Two days after the revolt had started, Roosevelt officially recognized the Panama- nian Republic and a treaty was signed that granted the United States virtual sove- reignity concerning the isthmian canal.[120]

   Although the president was criticized at home by Democrats and Anti-Imperialists for his reck less behavior that actually seemed more imperialistic than the Euro- peans, the public opinion was on Roosevelt’s side. They were grateful that the country had now the means to realize Mahan’s dream and saw itself performing a service to the general interest of mankind. The construction began in 1906 and the canal was completed, heavily fortified, in 1914.[121]

   The Panamanian episode had shown how far the United States was willing to go to implement its strategy and push through its interests.
 
 
 

Roosevelt had set the United States on a firm course of interventionism for national interests.
The status of world power it had achieved earlier had now been shown to the world. The Western hemisphere was under tight control from Washington that would not accept any challenge to its power. The nation had reaffirmed its interests in Asia although it had to acknowledge the emerging power of Japan. The expan- sion of the navy had by 1907 brought the U.S. to the second place in the ranks of the great seapowers.[122]  But would Roosevelt’s successors be able or willing to keep up the ‘strenuous life’ of an imperialistic foreign policy?