Now that the military issues that might have created crisis appeared to be solved, the United States would proceed to use their newly acquired economic wealth to create a more prosperous, more just world, safe from the rivalries that had led the world into chaos in 1914.

   The ‘recycling’ of the capital accumulated in the United States was to provide the poorer nations with means to finance their economic recovery and make them again potent customers for the U.S. industry. This process was to be managed by private banks, since government interference ran contrary to Hoover’s liberal market-econo- my creed. Nevertheless there had to be some sort of cooperation between the fede- ral government and the bankers to funnel the money were it worked best for ‘Ame- rican individualism’. The State Department thus set priorities for financing certain projects and showed the overall direction where the money should be transferred to - or not, for instance to the Soviet Union and parts of China controlled by the Com-
munists.[196]

   Another weapon that Hoover and Hughes held in their arsenal were the debts many nations owed the United States for loans granted during the war. If a nation was not willing to comply with American policies, it could be threatened with rapid collection of these debts. The loan- approval policy and the debts could be used by the U.S. as lever for implementing American policies throughout the world-to-be- created.[197]  Those eager for or dependent on American money had to be in line with U.S. foreign policy concepts to tap the vast U.S. capital resources.
Briefly, accordance with American principles (democracy, free trade...) was the key to money, development and prosperity. If a nation did not want to do as Uncle Sam told it to, it’d better got some good ideas soon, how to finance its economy.

   Especially in Europe, those tools would be needed to re-ignite the economy. The center of interest clearly lay on Germany. As Hughes had declared in 1921, „there can be no economic recuperation in Europe unless Germany recuperates.“[198]  Not wanting to let Europe sink back into chaos, Hoover and Hughes’ concern was to stabilize  Germany. In 1923, the reparations had nearly strangled Germany, it was no longer able to fulfil its payments to the Allies. The French didn’t care much and struck back by invading the Rhineland they had long been eyeing up. The U.S. saw the fragile European stability at stake and put considerable pressure on the French by demanding immediate payment of its debts. The French, thus at Washington’s mercy, agreed to attend a meeting in 1924 that ought to solve the crisis. The mee- ting, however, was to be conducted by American bankers and businessmen - Con- gress (that was still controlled by isolationists) would not have to be consulted and the government would not be responsible for possible failure.[199]

   The Dawes-Plan that resulted from the meeting set yearly rates of reparations and provided Germany with an immediate $200 million loan. „[Er] ließ die Bereitschaft der U.S.-Regierung erkennen, die großen Finanzreserven der Nation einzusetzen, um Europa gemäß einer liberal- kapitalistischen Ordnung wiederaufzubauen.“[200]

   And it actually seemed to work out; the money for the loans was gathered in a few days time, Germany’s economy was rebooted and enjoyed steady growth for the next five years and investment in Europe’s industry soared. It seemed incredible, „almost single-handedly the United States had rebuilt Germany and much more of Europe besides.“[201]  American officials in Europe were enthusiastic as they obser- ved „that America is the creditor nation and is trusted in all Europe even were she is despised (...) gives us a potential power to straighten out affairs over here.“[202]

   Thomas Paine’s prophecy of Americans having the ‘power to begin the world over again’ was finally coming true, it appeared.  But all was not well. The mounting dependence on foreign money gave German nationalists a lasting point of criticism; British-U.S. relations severed as American money pushed into the markets hitherto controlled by London’s banks; and the tools of ‘American Individualism’ began to slip out of Hoover’s hands as investors were looking for new opportunities and found them off the State Department path, for instance in Russia’s New Economic Plan (NEP) or on the New York Stock Exchange were rates were skyrocketing.[203]

   In Latin America, Hoover and Hughes came to see the interventions of old as threats to their world of ‘American individualism’ as they cost many sympathies for the Yankees and had most ended up in producing only more turmoil. Oil interests had now reached the position of railway and plantations in earlier times. Already in 1921, the U.S. apologized to Colombia for inciting Panamanian independence and paid an indemnity of $25 million. The effects were impressive, in the next eight years U.S. investment soared from $2 million to $124 million. In 1924 Hughes pulled the U.S. troops out of the Dominican Republic. In Mexico, nationalization schemes for resources (oil!) and land and a seizure of church property and the separation of state and religion had many lobbyists in Washington cry for intervention. Instead, a mediator was sent to Mexico City who achieved a compromise that abandoned the plans and provided for reconciliation between the government and the Catholic church. In Nicaragua, the U.S. troops were withdrawn in 1925 but had to be sent back in again the next year as revolts erupted again and President Coolidge feared Mexican sponsored ‘Bolshevists’ would take over. A cease-fire was negotiated and elections held in 1928, 1930 and 1932 under U.S. supervision. But one rebel leader, Augusto Sandino, kept fighting the ‘intruders’ and could not be hunted down. The U.S. public condemned the Marines presence and they were finally withdrawn in 1933.

   In 1928 the United States finally agreed on a declaration that outlawed the use of force in internal affairs of other nations in the Americas, and emphasized the peace- ful settlement of disputes.
After his election in late 1928, Hoover personally travelled to the South American states to spread the new gospel of Pan-American cooperation.[204] Although not flawless, ‘American individualism’ seemed to have finally found a sound way of getting along with the ‘barbarian’ Latin Americans.