Das Kernproblem der [Nachkriegswelt] liegt darin, ob die in Jalta festgelegte mili- tärische Grenze, die als provisorisch für die Dauer des Waffenstillstandes gedacht war, die politische Grenze zweier feindlicher Koalitionen werden sollte.“[295] (transl.: The central problem of the post-war world consists in the question if the military border agreed on in Yalta, intended as provisory for the time of the cease- fire, was to become the political border of two hostile coalitions. -B.Wahler)  
Harry S. Truman and his advisers wanted to prevent just that. A division of Europe into spheres of influence where „every-one imposes his own system as far as his army can reach“[296], as Stalin had put it, would exclude American trade relations with all of Eastern Europe.

   As Truman went to the Potsdam Conference he still had in mind how British diplomats had recently complained that the Soviet Union took unilateral action in areas under its control, violating the Yalta agreements.[297]  Truman wanted to fight that, now that peace had found its way back to Europe after the Third Reich had surrendered on May 7, 1945.[298]  The conference would commence on July 17. Churchill also immediately voiced his complaints to Truman about an ‘iron curtain’ separating the Soviets’ occupation zone from the West, behind which they imple-
mented their system and disregarded self-determination. It would thus be necessary to come to an agreement with Stalin or determine what his position was before the Allies dissolved their armies.[299] Churchill feared a rapid U.S. withdrawal from the continent, something the American public was eager for. Just like at the end of World War I, Americans foremost wanted back to normal with their boys at home. Due to this, there remained only 10 U.S., French and British divisions on the Euro- pean continent in mid-1945 facing 30 Russian divisions stationed throughout Eastern Europe. With the Americans pulling out, not only would a ‘balance of power’ not exist, but an incredible vacuum of power would be a tasty bait for the Soviet forces.[300]

   The new president’s intentions were blocking the Soviets from shutting off eastern Europe as Europe, he realized, was one historically and economically interdepen- dent unity, and stopping the plans for German dismemberment, this would only have Germans forever working to undo it and thus pose new threats to peace in Eu- rope. A dismembered Europe would furthermore not fit into the American scheme of a prosperous, free trade world. The core of the European economy ripped apart, all of Europe’s economies would have to suffer. Truman objected to Stalin’s plans of the Polish territory moving to the West at the expense of Germany.

   Stalin was infuriated that the new chief executive wanted to unmake what Chur- chill and Roosevelt had conceded to him. He gave Truman two options:
1. a united Germany administered by all powers together which consequently would give the Soviets even influence in the West; or
2. a divided Germany with every power limited to its occupation zone. Truman, more suspicious about the Soviets' real objectives than Roosevelt, chose the latter. [301]  Americans still hoped that a future peace treaty would justly settle the issue, but under the option of a divided Germany, there existed no restraints that held Stalin from giving German territory to Poland. In this way, the Soviet leader had tied Poland closely to him, it depended on Soviet protection against possible Ger- man retaliation.[302]

   On July 16, American power received a great boost. The first atomic bomb had exploded on a test site in New Mexico. The United States now possessed a weapon of mass destruction unrivalled all over the world. But contrary to Truman’s high hopes, it did not serve at Potsdam to change things to Americans’ favor. He matter- of-factly told Stalin during the conference that the U.S. disposed of a new super- weapon and feeling reassured, Truman got tougher with the Soviets. They were unimpressed, Soviet agents had found out about the top secret ‘Manhattan Project’ as early as 1941. And with the help of spies Soviet scientists were racing to close that nuclear gap.[303]
President Truman had to admit that economic and military power did not automati- cally translate into political influence everywhere. He had been shown the limits of cooperation with the Soviet Union led by a determined Stalin.[304]

   How determined Stalin was, showed the maps of Europe as the eastern parts of it were painted ever more in red. In Romania, he had already started out in 1944 demanding of the country’s king to abdicate his throne and have a Moscow-orienta- ted government assume power. The United States protested this informal revolution and demanded to hold free elections in Romania. Soviets only maintained that their territorial propinquity gave them special rights and it was none of Washington’s business.[305]  In Poland ‘broadly based government’ did mean that the Russians would tolerate no 50-50 proposal on participation of the exile-government in Lon- don. The United States and Great Britain often demanded that the Soviets comply with democratic principles, but again without result. Stalin wanted his puppet state -‘cordon sanitaire’ to include Poland that had been twice in the last two wars the gateway for German armies. Finally, two exiles held office in the Lublin Govern-
ment and the western powers immediately recognized the new government. After all, Red Army troops stood in Poland and for security issues Poland had turned to Moscow.

   Over time, the State Department came to discover a pattern in how the states lost their power to the Kremlin, to Moscow. Coalitions were put together first and inclu- ded all ‘anti-fascist movements. The Communists had no majority in these govern- ments  but always the important post of Department for internal affaires. This new power  allowed them to start cleansing the country of their opponents. The final transformation produced, the economy was totally socialized. The land was to divi- ded up and the industries nationalized. A small group of people would lead the country and turn to Moscow for advice. By February 1948, each country in eastern Europe had become  a ‘peoples’ democracy’ and firmly knit into the Soviet net of power.[306]

   If the East was lost, then western Europe must not be lost at all price. But their industries destroyed, unemployed Europeans were attracted to Socialism and might one day fall into the arms of Moscow’s prophets. The victory of the Labour Party in Great Britain, warned Truman that even  the United States’ most superb power would have demand for Soviet seduction. In late 1945, the U.S. forgave Bri- tain much of its war debts and even provided an low-interest $3.7 billion credit.[307]

   In Germany, where the United States’ occupation zone covered the Southeast and ‘Midwest’, the fault lines between the Soviets and the West ran through the country, the confrontation was immediate. In early 1946, the U.S. lifted the JCS1067 that limi- ted the activity of German industry and forbade ‘fraternization’ with the Germans, the people of a ‘defeated’, not a ‘liberated’ state. In May reparations were stopped in the American zone, the United States had no interest in crippling Germany’s eco- nomy and then having to pay for it. In September 1946, secretary of state James Byrnes disclosed in Stuttgart to the Germans what Americans had in mind. The United States wanted to foster German unity through democratic means, it would assist the Germans in rebuilding their country and leading it back into the com- munity of peaceful nations. Since the Soviets made joint control over Germany near- ly impossible, the United States went their own way that finally led to the founda- tion of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. But along the way, the United States had successfully appeased their former enemy with economic aid, reeduca- tion and American lifestyle (continuing the mission to Americanize the world) and proves of ‘sympathy’ such as the Berlin airlift of 1948.[308]

   Japan was the other regional economic hub as well as a power capable of ‘con- taining’ an expansionist Russia or Soviet Union, another despised but useful  ‘line of defense’, that had been destroyed. Anyhow here, the United States did not have to quarrel with opposing occupation forces.
General Douglas MacArthur was appointed Supreme Commander for Allied Powers but did govern the island empire only indirectly, a Japanese government persisted. He imprisoned and hanged war criminals, established a new radical democratic con- stitution and helped start a democratic political process, performed a successful land reform and dismembered the influential corporate combines. With American credits and a sustained flow of resources, the economy soon recovered.
The country’s focus had been shifted on its economy and its successes in this field ensured it a place in the American global network against Communism.[309]

   In China however, things went by far not as smoothly. The KMT was involved in all-out civil war against the Communist forces of Mao Tse-tung. Ever since the 1930s, the United States had sided with Chiang’s KMT and refused to establish contacts to Mao. Although the KMT disposed of the larger forces, it lacked the Communists’ leadership and popular support. Chiang was losing battle after battle against Mao’s forces. Harry S. Truman decided to send General George Marshall
to China to mediate a compromise between the two parties. In early 1947 though, Marshall returned, his mission had failed. Although enjoying confidence from both side, Marshall did not succeed in talking Chiang into reforms that would draw support from the Communists. Instead his corrupt government and the rigid Chi- nese society proved to be a fertile soil for Mao’s message.
Considering the continuous successes of  Mao, Washington had to realize that its  ‘junior partner’ would soon be lost without any immediate and massive help. In the first months of 1949, Chiang and what remained of his army fled to Taiwan, an is- land off the Chinese coast.[310]

   America was shocked. The president had ‘lost’ China to the Communists. The American public finally awoke from their dreams of isolation and wanted to show strength. The situation was compared to that of ‘Munich’ 1938 where Chamberlain had tried to 'appease' Hitler and Americans interpreted that it was useless  trying to talk to the worldwide Communist aggressors. They would have to be dealt with .[311]