Throughout the Cold War, the time of limited choice, the time of active anti-com- munist ‘internationalism’, United States foreign policy and the way how Americans presented themselves to the world has to a great degree been defined by pointing out the differences to their opponents, the Communist systems around the world. Americans were what the Communists were not and vice-versa. At the threshold to the last decade of this century (and The American Century as well) this option suddenly vanished. New ways would have to be devised to explain what Ame-
rica stands for and where Americans stand at the end of the Cold War.

   Americans were confused at what they saw. Their president, Ronald Reagan, a stern anti-communist was shaking hands with the Communist Party’s secretary general Mikhail Gorbachev and agreeing on putting an end to the arms-race and sharply reducing the arsenals of both nations.[329]
More confusion was yet to come after George Herbert Walker Bush, a former U.S. liaison officer in China and head of CIA had entered the oval office in 1989. Gorba- chev withdrew Soviet troops from the Moscow-led puppet states in East Europe and told their leaders they had to cope on their own with domestic opposition. These groups voiced their protest ever more audibly and the Communist rulers throughout the Soviet ‘cordon sanitaire’ were swept away in some months time in late 1989. The Solidarity movement won free elections in Poland in Summer; in October, the old rulers were overthrown in Czechoslovakia and Hungary; in late December the Romanian dictator Ceaucescu had to leave his life in the country’s revolution; and on November 9 the symbol of Cold War, the visualization of the division of Europe, the Berlin Wall came down and Germans from the East and the West could once again visit each other unhamperedly.
President Bush embraced Gorbachev’s policies that now had proven to be serious and together with German chancellor Helmut Kohl helped convince him and the reluctant French and British that Germans be admitted reunification.[330]

   Bush and Gorbachev both agreed, that somehow, the Cold War had just exhaled its last breath.
What seemed even more disturbing was that Gorbachev insited that „it is important for the future of Europe that you are in Europe, so we don’t want to see you out of here.“[331]  The once so feared Soviet bloc was disintegrating at high speed. In spring 1991, the Warsaw Pact, NATO’s adversary was dissolved; Comecon, the eco- nomic pact of Communist states, followed soon; at the same time many of the re- publics the USSR was composed of demanded independence; Arms reduction trea- ties that reduced the danger of turning Europe into a nuclear wasteland were fre- quently signed; in August 1991 a right-wing coup aimed at undoing all of Gorba- chev's achievements, but it  could be crushed with Boris Yeltsin at the front of the resistance; having emerged as the new leader, Yeltsin declared on December 25, 1991 that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist.
The ‘evil empire’, as Reagan had once dubbed it was gone, all of the United States’ large-scale military planning had lost its capricious counterpart.[332]

   But it had already been substituted by a new threat to world peace: Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had his troops invade Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and held thus 20% of the world’s oil reserves.
President Bush committed the USA to resisting any further advance by Hussein and to liberating Kuwait. Among the reasons for this step Bush mentioned the need to secure the flow of the Arabian oil (particularly important for Europe’s economy), the will to destroy the Iraqi dictator's capacity to produce and deploy weapons of mass destruction and, most notably, quelling a threat to the newborn ‘new world order’ that was to emerge after the Cold War. And after six months of demands, the ‘new world order’ hit hard. An alliance of over 28 nations under U.S. command liberated Kuwait within 100 days, but failed to destroy Hussein’s nuclear or chemical arsenal (if existent and to what amounts) nor did the alliance topple the Iraqi ruler for fears of creating a dangerous vacuum of power and stirring anti-Western sentiments in the region.

   The part of the ‘new world order’ most pleasing to U.S. military was that following the war the United States acquired several bases throughout the region and estab- lished a continuous presence with 24,000 troops, 26 warships and 150 planes.[333]

   In the shadow of the war with Iraq, the Middle-East peace talks were recommen- ced in October 1991 in Madrid; the U.S. protest against the Israeli settlement of Jews on the Westbank contributed to a change of government to the more cooperative Yitzhak Rabin.[334]

  In 1992 the war glory of President Bush had worn off, he lost the presidential elec- tions to a young contender from the South, William (Bill) Jefferson Clinton from Arkansas. He won the elections repeating, like a mantra, what Bush had failed to realize amidst his foreign policy search for a ‘new world order’:
„It’s the economy, stupid.“
In 1992 the nation was quite uncertain, which role to play in this brave, new world with millions of people home- and jobless, American inner cities deteriorating, crime rates soaring and the trade deficit growing. Gloomy times seemed to be ahead, other powers seemed to be taking over the leadership role the United States had held in all sectors for so long. Books on the 'ongoing American decline' were frequent guests on the nation's bestseller-lists. A whole people, leaders and workers alike seemed to be obsessed with mourning the fading glorious past.

   But now, in 1998, the year that marks the centennial of The American Century, Americans appear to be making themselves comfortable at the center, at the throne of the ‘new world order’.
Although the lasts years have seen very disturbing developments in international relations, such as the ‘new nationalism’ that has shaken the countries that rose from the ashes of the Soviet Union, the former Yougoslavia (where religion has poured even more fuel into the fire), Ruanda and many other places where massacres and even genocides provide the disgusting weekday-night TV diner.
Americans have seen their mission fail in Somalia and had to take criticism for inter- vening in Haiti, where they brought back the elected president into power, feared (and still do) the menace that the proliferation of Soviet nuclear arsenal represents [335]  and get angry over the zigzag course of the Middle East Peace Talks and yet, they now more firmly but not always very majestically handle their position as ‘the world’s only-remaining superpower’.

   Europeans complain regularly about the arrogance of (combined economic, poli- tical and military) power that seems to have taken hold of American decision-makers; one example that has stirred outrage throughout Europe was the Madrid NATO conference where the United States let the world know how enlargement of the institution will have to proceed without consulting its partners. Europeans were deeply hurt in their pride and decried the ‘U.S. imperialism’.[336]

   Their anger receives new justification when they think of the especially outra- geous ‘Helms-Burton Law’, the darling-project of Republican hardliner Jesse Helms. All non-American enterprises and organisations that deal with the ‘evil man on America’s porch’, Fidel Castro, or his country will be punished by denying them trade with the United States. Some compare it to the 1901 Platt amendment that just as well only served to protect U.S. interests and imperialistically granted its creators the control over Cuba. An obvious violation of international right. Moreover the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms, has a similar despisable message in store when addressing other foreign policy issues. He insists that Washinton have the say in who heads the U.N. and what kind of politics that organization would implement. If U.N. does not behave, Jesse’ll just stop paying for it. Best would be of course if one appointed hillbilly Jesse Helms from North
Carolina right away to secretary-general.[337]

   This stubborn Republican exerting enormous influence over the United States' attitude on foreign policy issues has become synonymous with a reckless, short- sighted behavior that renders U.S. interests the leitmotiv of diplomacy and alienates both friend and foe. This lack of idealism, the lack of the will to improve the world by proliferating American values, leaves a huge gap in a comprehensive concept for a contemporary foreign policy.

   Luckily, not all those who are responsible for U.S. foreign policy are such an annoyance. Yet, Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Adviser and a think- tank of his own, also propagates a quite offensive model of international relations. Like so many Americans, the precondition of all his concepts is the conviction that the interests of the United States and the world are more or less the same.
The European ‘vassals’ are the bridgehead of American values and ideals, their cor- respondence on another continent, on the ‘Eurasian chessboard’. In this vague area stretching from Dublin to Vladivostok and on to Tokyo the United States and its policies set the tone.
As a global policeman patrolling the world, the U.S. will ensure stability and peace in most regions of the world. But, he continues, the American public will not very long be willing to ‘carry the burden of having to watch for law and order’ through- out the world and it would have thus to shift this responsibility to a security system made up of nations that orient themselves at the American ideology.[338]

   Here remains space for the European Union, India, Japan, South Africa, Argentina and Brazil and other nations or communities thereof who share a common set of democratic values and feel a commitment to secure peace, stability and common- wealth in their neighborhoods.

   Publicist Flora Lewis however sees the ‘last surviving superpower’ suffering from a loss of orientation. To her, the United States is longing for an unequivocally de- fined foe for whom to look behind every palm. But their current rage with which they warn the world of the global threat that Saddam poses, is only evidence for Americans’ uncertainty in dealing with this unrivalled, immense power. A great part of the U.S. society (and surely an even greater part of Republican Congressmen) struggles to decide whether this hegemony is a privilege and a duty they have fought for and hard-earned, or if it is but a burden they want to get rid off as soon
as possible.
Americans are, according to Lewis, astonished and even angered that the world they are trying to save is so ungrateful. Americans don’t want to rule mankind, but they want the world to acknowledge that they if anyone were fittest for this position. She advices the United States to be more careful and sensitive when making use of its power.[339]

   In late January this year, President Clinton presented to Congress in his ‘State of the Union’ address a foreign policy agenda that once again shows that the United States is accepting its singular world power role and takes interest in global issues as well as in local and regional issues around the globe.
The issues are: promoting stability in Asia, widening security in Europe by enlar- ging NATO, keep working for a firm peace in Bosnia, making citizens around the world safe from chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, have Congress pay for the U.N. bills and increasing action against international terror, drug trafficking and crime. In contrast to some of his Republican competitors, he renews America's mis- sion to the world, draws upon the zeal that was in the hearts and minds of Ameri- cans for over two centuries and maintains that the United States won't let go its lasting chance to 'begin the world over again'.

   As to the country’s determination to be and remain a world power, also after the first (?) American Century has passed away, Bill Clinton said:

„We have both the power and the duty to build a new era of peace and security and to meet that challenge we are helping to write international rules-of-the-road for the 21st century; protecting those who join the family of nations, isolating those who do not. (...) The United States stands ready in every region, on every continent to strengthen the system of law, political and economic freedom and the respect for human rights that enables nations not only to exist but to progress. In that effort we will expect others to do their fair share but we will not hesitate to lead.“