|
|
 |
|
|
By 18 June 1812, Napoleon's armies were massed between Danzig and Warsaw and along the Vistula. On 23 June he appeared at that river to oversee the invasion of Russia. It kicked off at 10:00 p.m., when Gen. Morand passed three companies of the 13th Light Infantry Regiment across the Niemen in small boats, who soon encountered a company of Russian hussars. When the Russians' officer advanced to challenge the French skirmishers, they responded with musketry and the fighting had begun. Over the next two days the rest of the Grand Army made an unopposed crossing and began to fan out across the Russian countryside.
When the French advanced a day earlier than the Russian command had anticipated, Barclay felt compelled to withdraw and concentrate at Sventisiani. Docturov, who apparently did not receive the orders to move, remained immobile. Napoleon had not expected Barclay's withdrawal, but was then even more surprised by Bagration's failure to try countering by advancing toward Warsaw. Bagration also withdrew north to join Barclay. That made Napoleon believe the Russians had already divined his intended main line of attack through Kovno and would not play into his hands.
Meanwhile Barclay moved toward Drissa, unaware Bagration was attempting to join him. His movements delayed that link up. The gap between the two armies attracted Napoleon's atrtention; he hoped to trap Bagration by thrusting Eugène's corps into it. He also ordered Jèrome's Westphalians to change over from a defensive posture and advance so as to maintain the pressure on the 2nd Army of the West.
Unfortunately for the French, the opportunity slipped by. Eugène's forces were two days behind schedule, which delay kept Napoleon from pushing forward until his flank was secure. For his part, Eugène had simply been delayed at the Niemen River due the tangle of his supply train. It also became evident Jèrome was not advancing quickly enough to maintain good contact with Bagration The first weeks of the campaign were thus most unsatisfying for Napoleon in that the Russians refused to stand and fight.
In fact, the first major action didn't occur until Smolensk was reached on 17 August. The battle along the walls of the city was inconclusive and stalled. The French tried to break the deadlock around nightfall by firing howitzer shells directly into the city. Thick black smoke soon began to rise from several points. The smoke was in turn soon lit by long spires of flame. The small fires gradually swelled and merged until the entire city was engulfed. Taking advantage of the cover provided by the conflagration, the Russians withdrew and again resumed their retreat to the east. Napoleon was left with the burned and ravaged remains of Smolensk, and the decisive battle had again escaped him.
Frustrated, Napoleon launched his pursuit and once again closed around the Russians just east of Smolensk, at the vital crossroads of Lubino. In that engagement the Westphalian Corps was sent along side roads to cut off the Russian withdrawal, but it failed. Those troops proved not to be aggressive, and their commander failed to push as hard as necessary to close the trap. The failure of all his efforts to provoke a conclusive engagement made Napoleon frantic. That desperation would in fact be the cause of the one major decision on the battlefield at Borodino that would ultimately have disastrous results.
